




KBC Group

“Managing financial services in a changing world”
Goldman Sachs Conference, June 2009

www.kbc.com

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Reminder: business profile




Allocation of capital as of 31-Dec-08


- Top player in Belgium and CEE-4; 75-80% of revenue is generated in markets with leading market share
- Niche strategies in merchant banking activities and private banking outside home markets (mainly European focus)

Reminder: crisis impact on performance

Underlying return on equity
(ex. non operating items and asset markdowns)



Non operating items incl. asset markdowns (in m. EUR)



- So far, underlying performance remained satisfactory, including 'reasonable' levels of loan losses
- On the other hand, significant 'damage' from asset markdowns due to financial market crisis

When the financial crisis came to public notice, KBC was well-positioned to withstand its fallout:

- With loan-to-deposit ratio at 89% rather independent of wholesale funding
- Low exposure to US subprime RMBS:
 - 9.5bn CDO book includes 84% exposure to corporate underlying
 - Super senior tranches adequately covered by 'AAA' insurance company
 - Synthetic CDO structure allowed 'continued quality enhancement' through swapping of reference names
- CEE economies kept up well in 2008
- With ongoing share buy-back and tier-1 ratio close to 9% (end-2007), assumed to be over-capitalised

But KBC's position was not 'decoupled' and financial performance suffered nevertheless:

- Margin compression (mainly in Belgium) due to deposit price competition in core markets driven by 'war for liquidity' by major peers
- Markdown of CDO portfolio due to rating downgrades and falling corporate credit market prices driven by fears for 'real economy' meltdown
 - Moreover, synthetic credit structures excluded from 'IAS39 carve out'
- Although CEE economic performance remained strong until end 2008, loan losses started to rise (169bp in 1Q 2009)

Decisive measures were taken to contain risk, safeguard solvency and reduce OPEX:

1. Substantial containment of structured credit risk

bn euros	Nominal	MTM loss booked	Effective cash loss ⁽¹⁾	Protected by
Super senior CDO CDO notes CDO equity	5.5 3.2 0.8	-5.3	-2.0	90% state guarantee Fully written down ^(*) Fully written down
ABS	6.1	-1.7	-0.2	Accounting reclassification
MBIA hedge	14.4	-3.1	-0.0	90% state guarantee

- Remark 1: state guarantee (achieved May 2009) includes 10% risk sharing part (worst case, assuming no underlying value: -1.5bn loss)
- Remark 2: state guarantee protects against further downside, but leaves writedown reversal potential intact

(*) All equity/notes on FP CDO were written down, not including 0.8bn third party CDOs (1) Based on expected near term losses

(cont'd):


2. Hybrid capital securities issued to State:

- Pro forma Tier-1 ratio currently at 11%, of which 8.3 % core – in order to absorb impact of 'real economy' downturn


3. Group-wide cost reduction program:

- 2008 cost level was flat year-on-year (like-for-like), with lower staff costs offsetting additional non-staff expenses (incl. restructuring charges)
- FTE reduction: >5% headcount earmarked for 2009-2010
- 2009 cost level expected to be down year-on-year (cost/income ratio back to pre-crisis levels)

Product spreads in Belgium (KBC)



Spread quarterly average yield on re-investment vs. remuneration on savings accounts



Margin on new production mortgage loans (lower line) and on SME loans (upper line)

- KBC took the lead in bringing deposit remuneration down in Belgium: deposit margins recovered significantly, war for deposits ended, sustainable earnings support expected from that side going forward
- Improved pricing climate also allowing adequate pricing of credit risk

Navigating through the storm (4)

Loan losses (KBC)

	Size book	1Q 09 LLR	2008 LLR	Average '99 - '08	Peak '99 - '08	Delta '08 to peak: pre-tax impact on Tier 1
Belgium (retail)	56 bn	0.13%	0.09%	0.16%	0.31%	± 10bps
CEE	41 bn	1.69%	0.73%	0.92%	2.75%	± 60bps
Merchant Bank⁽¹⁾ (incl. reclassified securities)	75 bn	0.59%	0.48%	0.39%	0.90%	± 25bps
Total		0.70%	0.46%			± 100bps

LLR: loan loss ratio, amount of losses incurred on troubled loans as a % of total average outstanding loan portfolio (annualised)

(1) Moderate cost of risk in Irish portfolio: 15 bps in 2008 and 35 bps in 1Q2009






- At 70 bps, loan losses remain 'acceptable'
- If loan losses were to rise across business units from 2008 levels to historical peak levels, the combined tier 1 capital impact would be around 100bps (apart from positive impact of pre-provision results)

Navigating through the storm (5)

Credit quality in CEE

Country	Loan book	Current NPL	NPL peak KBC	NPL peak banking system
Czech Rep	20 bn	2%	3% (2000)	18% (2000)
Poland	7 bn	4%	29% (2003)	24% (2003)
Hungary	7 bn	2%	4% (2000)	23% (1999)
Slovakia	4 bn	2%	4% (2008)	35% (2000)
Russia	3 bn	2%	N/A	40% (1999)
CEE, total	41 bn	2%	7% (2003)	

- We expect KBC's 2009-2010 CEE loan losses to be at 200-230 bps (implying NPL to increase to 5% in 2009 and 8% in 2010, on average)
- Higher risk zones in CEE include Hungary and Russia
 - Underwriting criteria further tightened back in 2008: stop growth for corporate loans, unsecured consumer finance, FX mortgage loans, car leasing,...



- After the weak 4Q 2008, 1Q 2009 has shown a positive turn in underlying performance across all business units (which continued so far in 2Q 2009)


Refocus business portfolio on core activities in core markets:

- For sure, the future will be more regulated and less leveraged
- Downsizing of non core activities is vital, so far 25% of RWA (35 bn) earmarked for being unwound/divested
 - Positive impact on tier 1 ratio up to some 250bps (rough estimate)
 - Activities generated some 0.5bn net profit, on average in 2007/2008 (preliminary indication)
 - Ongoing restructuring may be modified according to EU guidance (approval for State initiative pending)


Action Plan (being prepared):

- Downsizing of corporate banking presence outside home markets (corporate lending, annex local dealing rooms)
- Further cut in investment banking; derivatives business and structured credit largely put on run-off (headcount: -35% in 2008, another -35%, 500 FTE, in 2009)
- Strategic review of other 'non core' activities

KBC, business overview of underlying IB income (bn euros, average for 2007-2008)



KBC, geographical overview of credit risk (bn euros), 31-3-2009



Safeguarding strong value of existing core franchise:

- Core retail markets largely untouched ('sustainable earnings power' intact)
- Opportunity to more adequately price credit risk and liquidity cost
- However, customer scepticism resulting from weak investment yields
- 'Putting the customer first' will be on the forefront in the years ahead (service levels & confidence enhancement)

Major downside risk going forward:

- Loan losses within “normal” credit portfolio (including CEE, Russia, Ireland,...), but also on ABS (largely reclassified to loan portfolio at year-end 2008)
- Unwinding/divesting process of discontinued activities (esp. derivatives business at *KBC Financial Products* entity)
- Trend throughout the sector of adverse customer sentiment resulting from weak investment yields
- 10% risk sharing part in State Guarantee transaction covering SS CDO portfolio and monoline counterparty risk (worst case: 1.5 bn euros, assuming no underlying value)

Questions ?

Annex: Analysts' opinions

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Credit Suisse Securities	Guillaume Tiberghien	guillaume.tiberghien@credit-suisse.com	15-May-09	+
Degroof Banque	Ivan Lathouders	ivan.lathouders@degroof.be	18-May-09	=
Deutsche Bank	Brice Vandamme	brice.vandamme@db.com	13-May-09	-
Exane BNP Paribas	François Boissin	francois.boissin@exanebnpparibas.com	19-May-09	+
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